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PADILLA V. KENTUCKY: BENDING OVER
BACKWARD FOR FAIRNESS IN
NONCITIZEN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Alison Syré
INTRODUCTION
Zhong Lin was born in China, but has lived in the United
States for most of his adult life.1 Until 2007, Mr. Lin lived with
his wife and two children, ages eleven and nine, all three of
whom are United States citizens.2 He had strong business
interests in the United States, as well as family and community
ties, but never became a U.S. citizen.3 Mr. Lin considers
himself to be entirely American, and sees China merely his
place of birth.4 In 2007, Mr. Lin was charged with one count of
conspiracy to commit tax fraud.5 Upon the advice of his
attorney, he entered into a plea agreement, under which he
agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a sentence of one year of
probation, restitution payments to the IRS, and a fine.6 Mr. Lin
fulfilled each element of his sentence, but his attorney failed to
J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2013; B.A. University of
Wisconsin–Madison, 2008. The author would like to thank her family and
friends for their support during the writing process. She also wholeheartedly
thanks the members of the Journal of Law & Policy for their stellar efforts in
preparing this Note for publication, and James Fox, Esq. for sparking her
interest in this topic.
1
United States v. Zhong Lin, No. 3:07-CR-44-H, 2011 WL 197206, at
*3 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 20, 2011).
2
Id. at *1, *3.
3
Id. at *3.
4
See id.
5
Id. at *1.
6
Id. at *1, *3.
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tell him one very important thing: his guilty plea would render
him deportable.7
Roselva Chaidez’s story has many similarities. Ms. Chaidez
is a lawful permanent resident from Mexico, who entered the
United States in 1971.8 She is a fifty-four-year-old grandmother
of three, all United States citizens.9 In 2003, she had been living
in northern Illinois for more than twenty-five years.10 That year,
Ms. Chaidez was charged with multiple counts of mail fraud.11
With the advice of counsel, she pled guilty to two of the counts,
and was sentenced to four years probation and ordered to pay
restitution and a fine.12 In 2009, Ms. Chaidez’s citizenship
petition was denied, and the Department of Homeland Security
placed her in removal proceedings based on her mail fraud
conviction.13 For her plea, Ms. Chaidez “forfeited her right to a
trial and ultimately her privilege of remaining a free and lawful
permanent resident, living in the only society she knows.”14 Like
Mr. Lin, Ms. Chaidez’s attorney did not inform her that her
plea would render her deportable.15
Mr. Lin and Ms. Chaidez both challenged their guilty pleas
following the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Padilla v.
Kentucky,16 which held that the failure to inform a defendant of
the potential immigration consequences of pleading guilty

7

See id. at *2 (crediting Lin’s testimony that he “entered into his plea
agreement based upon mistaken legal advice only recently revealed”).
8
Brief of Defendant-Appellee at *3, Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d
684 (7th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-3623).
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id. at *8–9.
15
Id. at *7–8.
16
See generally United States v. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d 896, 898
(N.D. Ill. 2010), rev’d 654 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011); Motion to Withdraw
Plea of Guilty and Set Aside Judgment of Conviction and Sentence, United
States v. Zhong Lin, No. 07CR00044, 2010 WL 6510225 (W.D. Ky. Nov.
19, 2010) [hereinafter Motion to Withdraw Plea].
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constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.17 Despite their
nearly identical circumstances, however, the courts hearing their
petitions came to vastly different outcomes due to a difference in
opinion regarding whether Padilla applied retroactively.18 Mr.
Lin filed a writ of coram nobis to challenge his federal
conviction in the Western District of Kentucky.19 Judge Heyburn
of that court determined that Padilla applied retroactively and,
accordingly, could provide relief for Mr. Lin, even though it
was decided after Mr. Lin’s conviction became final.20 Judge
Heyburn granted Mr. Lin’s petition for coram nobis, and Mr.
Lin is now free to continue living in the United States.21 Ms.
Chaidez also filed a writ of coram nobis,22 which was initially
granted by Judge Gottschall in the Northern District of Illinois.23
On appeal in the Seventh Circuit, however, a two-judge majority
found Padilla did not apply retroactively, making relief
unavailable to individuals such as Ms. Chaidez, whose
convictions had already become final.24 The ruling maintained
Ms. Chaidez’s conviction, as well as her deportable status. One
can imagine that, had Ms. Chaidez been living in Western
Kentucky, rather than Northern Illinois, her case may have
turned out very differently.
Deportation may be the most severe part of the penalty that
can be imposed on noncitizen defendants.25 Yet, until Padilla,

17

Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010).
See Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 694 (7th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Zhong Lin, No. 3:07-CR-44-H, 2011 WL 197206, at *1–2
(W.D. Ky. Jan. 20, 2011).
19
See generally Motion to Withdraw Plea, supra note 16.
20
Id. at *1–2.
21
Id. at *3.
22
United States v. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d 896, 898 (N.D. Ill. 2010),
rev’d, 654 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011).
23
Id. at 904.
24
Id. at 694. Judge Williams dissented, framing Padilla as an application
of an old rule (Strickland) to new facts. Id. at 694–96 (Williams, J.,
dissenting). Since Judge Williams was one of only three judges considering
Ms. Chaidez’ petition, the result was essentially dictated by the fact that one
way of framing Padilla’s rule got one more vote than another. See id.
25
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010).
18
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most courts considered deportation a “collateral consequence” of
a guilty plea, which an attorney had no duty to discuss with her
client.26 It is clear that, post-Padilla, defendants who do not
receive immigration advice from counsel before entering a guilty
plea have a viable claim with which they may challenge their
conviction.27 It is unclear, however, whether defendants whose
convictions became final before Padilla (such as Mr. Lin and
Ms. Chaidez), will also reap the benefit of the Padilla decision.
The Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of the
retroactive application of Padilla, and it appears unlikely that it
will do so in the near future.28 Thus, it is imperative that lower
courts correctly interpret Padilla to apply retroactively, as this
interpretation is most accurate and helps correct the injustice
suffered by ill-informed and uninformed noncitizen defendants.
This Note argues that an accurate application of Padilla
requires courts to properly frame the rule of Padilla so as to
apply the decision retroactively. Part IA provides an overview of
recent changes to the relationship between criminal and
immigration law, as well as a summary of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Padilla v. Kentucky.29 Part IB explores the question
of Padilla’s retroactive applicability and the potentially
substantial consequences of the slight variation in courts’
framing of Padilla’s rule.30 Part IC examines the reasoning of
courts that have arrived at contradictory interpretations of the
rule.31 Part II recommends two ways for courts to properly apply
Padilla to ensure that defendants whose convictions became final
26

See infra Part I.
Defendants convicted in federal courts challenge their convictions
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Act of June 25, 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006).
Defendants convicted in state court may do so under state post-conviction
relief statutes, see, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10 (McKinney 2005),
and under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 once they have exhausted their state remedies.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
28
The Supreme Court denied certiorari on a case presenting the issue of
Padilla’s retroactivity as recently as October 2011. See Commonwealth v.
Morris, 705 S.E.2d 503 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 115 (2011).
29
See infra Part IA.
30
See infra Part IB.
31
See infra Part IC.
27
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before the decision realize the benefits of Padilla. Part IIA gives
several reasons why it is more appropriate for courts to frame
Padilla’s rule as “the right to effective counsel”; Part IIB
discusses state courts’ unique ability to give broader effect to
Padilla, even if it is deemed “nonretroactive” under federal
standards; and Part IIC assures that neither option will greatly
disrupt interests of finality.32 The Note concludes that it is
incumbent upon courts to apply Padilla retroactively and to
correct the harm to noncitizens whose lives have been upended
by their counsels’ failure.
I. THE PADILLA LANDSCAPE AND THE QUESTION OF
RETROACTIVITY
Before 2010, most courts recognized a distinction between
the criminal and civil consequences of criminal convictions in
the case of a non-citizen defendant.33 The specific elements of a
defendant’s sentence were considered criminal or “direct”
consequences, whereas the deportation implications of a criminal
conviction were considered civil or “collateral” consequences.34
The latter were considered outside the scope of representation
required by the Sixth Amendment.35 Thus, the failure of a
defense attorney to advise his or her client of any civil
consequence of a criminal conviction was not grounds for an
ineffective counsel claim.36
Two pieces of legislation—The Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)37 and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996

32

See infra Part II.
Daniel Kanstroom, Padilla v. Kentucky and the Evolving Right to
Deportation Counsel: Watershed or Work-in-Progress?, 45 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 305, 307 (2011).
34
Id.
35
United States v. Fry, 322 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003).
36
Id.
37
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in
scattered titles of U.S.C.).
33
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(“IIRIRA”)38—created even more overlap between criminal law
and civil immigration law. Both dramatically expanded the list
of deportable criminal offenses and eliminated judicial discretion
over certain types of deportation orders.39 In the wake of this
legislation, deportation is often a virtually automatic result of
criminal conviction.40 Additionally, AEDPA and IIRIRA apply
retroactively, rendering deportable countless noncitizens that
were charged and convicted at a time when deportation was less
than a remote possibility.41 These results have led many to
complain that the laws are unduly harsh.42
A. Padilla v. Kentucky
In its 2010 decision in Padilla v. Kentucky,43 the United
States Supreme Court took a significant step in addressing the
overlap between criminal and civil consequences, acknowledging
the unworkable nature of the “direct” versus “collateral”

38

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in
scattered sections of 8, 18, 28 U.S.C.).
39
Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the
Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 99–100 (1998).
40
Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment:
Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1889, 1891 (2000).
41
See Morawetz, supra note 39, at 97, 99; see also Andrew Moore,
Criminal Deportation, Post-Conviction Relief and the Lost Cause of
Uniformity, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 665, 708–09 (2008) (“[D]ue to the
retroactive nature of the grounds of deportation expanded in 1996, noncitizens who pled guilty many years ago will now face immigration
consequences if the government becomes aware of their past offenses.”).
42
See, e.g., Amy Langenfeld, Living in Limbo: Mandatory Detention of
Immigrants Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of
1996, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1041 (1999); Morawetz, supra note 39, at 97. The
effects of these laws may be felt most strongly by certain groups. See Pooja
Gehi, Struggles from the Margins: Anti-Immigrant Legislation and the Impact
on Low-Income Transgender People of Color, 30 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 315
(2009); Claire A. Smearman, Second Wives’ Club: Mapping the Impact of
Polygamy in U.S. Immigration Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 382 (2009).
43
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
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distinction.44 In that case, Jose Padilla, a native of Honduras and
a Vietnam War veteran, who had been a lawful permanent
resident of the United States for more than forty years, pled
guilty to drug charges.45 As a result, Padilla faced mandatory
deportation under U.S. immigration law.46 In post-conviction
proceedings, Padilla alleged that his counsel had “not only failed
to advise him of [deportation consequences] prior to entering his
plea, but also told him that he ‘did not have to worry about
immigration status since he had been in the country so long.’”47
Padilla claimed that, were it not for his counsel’s erroneous
advice, he would have insisted on going to trial,48 and he thereby
challenged the plea’s validity under the ineffective counsel test
of Strickland v. Washington.49 According to Strickland, a
defendant may challenge the validity of his guilty plea on the
basis of ineffective assistance of counsel by showing “that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning
as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment. . . . [And] that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.”50
The Supreme Court found that, under Strickland, the failure
of Padilla’s counsel to inform Padilla of the immigration
consequences of pleading guilty rendered counsel’s performance
constitutionally deficient.51 The Court found the distinction
between “direct” and “collateral” consequences ill suited for the
case because of the close connection between deportation and the
criminal process.52 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens
explained that defense counsel had an obligation to inform

44

See id. at 1482.
Id. at 1477.
46
Id.; see also Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006).
47
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478 (citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 253 S.W.3d
482, 483 (Ky. 2008)).
48
Id.
49
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
50
Id. at 687.
51
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482–83.
52
Id. at 1482.
45
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clients of the possible deportation consequences of their plea.53
Failure to do so, the Court held, provided the defendant the
basis for a claim of ineffective counsel under Strickland.54 In
arriving at this conclusion, the Court considered the changing
landscape of federal immigration law over the last ninety years,
and noted that
[w]hile once there was only a narrow class of deportable
offenses and judges wielded broad discretionary authority
to prevent deportation, immigration reforms over time
have expanded the class of deportable offenses and
limited the authority of judges to alleviate the harsh
consequences of deportation. The “drastic measure” of
deportation or removal is now virtually inevitable for a
vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes.55
In light of these changes, the Court considered deportation
consequences to be “an integral part—indeed, sometimes the
most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on
noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”56
The Court further noted that professional norms already
supported the view that defense counsel was obligated to inform
her client of the risk of deportation.57 These professional
standards strongly indicated that counsel’s failure to inform her
client rendered her performance ineffective, since, under
Strickland, the evaluation of whether counsel’s performance is
53

Id. at 1483.
See id. at 1482.
55
Id. at 1478 (citing Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)).
56
Id. at 1480.
57
Id. at 1482 (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF
GUILTY 14-3.2(f), at 116 (3d ed. 1999); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 4-5.1(a), at 197
(3d ed. 1993); ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 13:23, at
555, 560 (3d ed. 2004); G. NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING § 3.03,
at 20–21 (1997); 2 INST. OF LAW & JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF STANDARDS
FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS, at D10, H8–H9, J8 (2000); NAT’L LEGAL
AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
REPRESENTATION § 6.2 (1995); Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes,
Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 697, 713–18 (2002)).
54
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constitutionally deficient is “necessarily linked to practice and
expectations of the legal community.”58
B. Retroactivity and the Problem of Framing
Padilla has been lauded by many in the legal community as a
great step towards preventing avoidable and wrongful
deportations.59 The decision provides a new avenue of postconviction relief for noncitizen criminal defendants.60 Many
courts are now struggling, however, with the question of
whether the relief secured by Padilla is available to a defendant
whose conviction became final before Padilla, but who is still
awaiting the deportation resulting from that conviction. Courts
are greatly divided on the issue of retroactivity.61
Under Teague v. Lane—the seminal case on the retroactive
application of new decisions dealing with constitutional criminal

58

Id.
See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in
Padilla v. Kentucky: The Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-A-Half
Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1463 (2011).
60
See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From
Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1137–51
(2011).
61
For cases applying Padilla retroactively, see generally United States v.
Orocio, 645 F.3d 630 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Dass, No. CRIM. 05140 (3) JRT, 2011 WL 2746181 (D. Minn. July 14, 2011); Marroquin v.
United States, No. M-10-156, 2011 WL 488985 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 4,
2011); Martin v. United States, No. 09-1387, 2010 WL 3463949 (C.D. Ill.
Aug. 25, 2010); Al Kokabani v. United States, No. 5:06-CR–207-FL, 2010
WL 3941836 (E.D.N.C. July 30, 2010); United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03mj-040, 2010 WL 2650625 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010); Commonwealth v.
Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892 (Mass. 2011); People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398,
400 (Sup. Ct. 2010); Ex parte Tanklevskaya, No. 01-10-00627-CR, 2011 WL
2132722 (Tex. Ct. App. May 26, 2011). For cases declining to apply Padilla
retroactively, see generally United States v. Chang Hong, No. 10-6294, 2011
WL 3805763 (10th Cir. Aug. 30, 2011); Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d
684 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Gilbert, No. 2:03-cr-00349-WJM-1,
2010 WL 4134286 (D.N.J. Oct. 19, 2010); State v. Truong, No. CR-961681, 2010 Me. Super. LEXIS 104 (July 30, 2010); People v. Kabre, 905
N.Y.S.2d 887 (Crim. Ct. 2010).
59
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procedure62—“an old rule applies both on direct and collateral
review, but a new rule is generally applicable only to cases that
are still on direct review.”63 A new rule may apply retroactively,
however, if “(1) the rule is substantive or (2) the rule is a
‘watershed rul[e] of criminal procedure’ implicating the
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”64
Padilla did not place “certain kinds of primary, private
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe,” and therefore did not create a
substantive rule.65 A watershed decision is one that “requires the
observance of ‘those procedures that . . . are implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.’”66 The exception is based on the
idea that “time and growth in social capacity, as well as judicial
perceptions of what we can rightly demand of the adjudicatory
process, will [at times] properly alter our understanding of
the bedrock procedural elements that must be found to vitiate the
fairness of a particular conviction.”67 This exception, however,
is very narrow68 and neither the courts nor this Note advocate its
application to Padilla.69 The Court in Teague admitted the
difficulty in determining whether a case announces a new rule
but gave limited guidance, explaining that “a case announces a
new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new
62

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007).
64
Id. (citing Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990)).
65
Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (explaining the “substantive rule” exception);
see also State v. Gaitan, No. A-109-10, 2012 WL 612311, at *12 (N.J. Feb.
28, 2012) (“[Padilla] does not implicate substantive criminal activity . . . .”).
66
Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S.
667, 693 (1971)).
67
Id. (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693–94) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
68
See Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 407 (2004) (discussing the
narrowness of Teague’s “watershed” exception).
69
See, e.g., United States v. Chang Hong, No. 10-6294, 2011 WL
3805763, at *8–9 (10th Cir. Aug. 30, 2011) (finding that Padilla was not a
watershed decision); Mathur v. United States, Nos. 7:07-CR-92-BO, 7:11CV-67-BO, 2011 WL 2036701, at *2 (E.D.N.C. May 24, 2011) (same);
Doan v. United States, 760 F. Supp. 2d 602, 605–06 (E.D. Va. 2011)
(same).
63
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obligation on the States or the Federal Government,” or “if the
result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the
defendant’s conviction became final.”70
Courts faced with petitions for post-conviction relief relying
on a retroactive application of Padilla are all faced with the
same question: Does Teague prohibit retroactive application of
Padilla? Although the question is the same, courts are coming to
starkly different answers; much of the variation may be
attributed to a difference in rule framing. In the course of their
Teague analyses, courts are framing Padilla’s rule one of two
ways—the right to effective counsel or counsel’s requirement to
inform clients of the potential immigration consequences. A
court’s choice as to how to frame Padilla’s rule effectively
determines whether a defendant will be permitted to stay in the
country or be removed.71
Courts rarely announce a rule in explicit terms; in fact,
courts determining whether Padilla created a new rule for
Teague purposes appear hesitant to directly identify what exactly
Padilla’s rule is.72 Even in the absence of a clear announcement,
however, the way these courts frame Padilla’s rule can be
deduced from the language and reasoning they use.
In Doan v. United States, the Eastern District of Virginia
considered Justice Alito’s suggestion in his concurrence that
defense counsel merely be required to inform clients that a
conviction may have immigration consequences, without
attempting to explain what those consequences may be.73 The
Doan court described Justice Alito’s recommendation as a
“different rule than the one adopted by the majority.”74 From
this, it can be inferred that the Doan court interpreted Padilla’s
70

Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 311 (1992) (“The crux of the
analysis when Teague is invoked . . . is identification of the rule on which
the claim for [post-conviction] relief depends.”).
72
Certainly some courts do directly identify Padilla’s rule. See Amer v.
United States, No. 1:06CR118-GHD, 2011 WL 2160553, at *3 (N.D. Miss.
May 31, 2011).
73
Doan, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 605 (citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct.
1473, 1488 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring)).
74
Id. (emphasis added).
71
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majority rule as requiring counsel to inform clients of the
potential immigration consequences of a conviction. After
framing the rule as such, the Doan court found that Padilla
created a new rule, and was therefore not retroactive.75
The District Court of New Jersey was clearer about what it
determined Padilla’s rule to be in U.S. v. Gilbert.76 The Gilbert
court concluded that the “Padilla decision requiring counsel to
advise a non-citizen client of deportation consequences is a new
constitutional rule and should not be applied retroactively to
Plaintiff’s 2006 sentence.”77 Like the Doan court, the Gilbert
court framed Padilla’s rule in a narrow, fact-specific way. The
rule, as characterized by the Gilbert court, was a departure from
prior case law and professional norms and was worthy of the
“new rule” label.78
Courts applying Padilla retroactively, on the other hand, have
framed the rule very differently. In Commonwealth v. Clarke, for
instance, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts found guidance in
previous United States Supreme Court decisions explaining that the
Strickland test “is one which of necessity requires a case-by-case
examination of the evidence,”79 and that “application of Strickland
in [a] novel context [does] not create [a] new rule.”80 The Clarke
court concluded, “Padilla is not a ‘new rule’ but merely an
application of Strickland,”81 and consequently applied retroactively
under Teague.82 Other courts applying Padilla retroactively use
similar reasoning, demonstrating a common choice in framing.83
75

Id. at 605–06.
See generally United States v. Gilbert, No. 2:03-cr-00349-WJM-1,
2010 WL 4134286 (D.N.J. Oct. 19, 2010).
77
Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
78
See id. (ruminating on the lack of Third Circuit or Supreme Court
rulings on whether “an attorney must make a client aware of possible future
immigration proceedings . . . .”).
79
Commonwealth v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892, 900 (Mass. 2011)
(quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 382 (2000)).
80
Id. (quoting Osagiede v. United States, 543 F.3d 399, 408 n.4 (7th
Cir. 2008)).
81
Id. at 901.
82
Id. at 904.
83
See, e.g., People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398, 404 (Sup. Ct. 2010)
76
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The framing in Doan and Gilbert is typical of courts that
have declined to apply Padilla retroactively. These courts
framed Padilla’s rule as counsel’s duty to inform clients of
deportation consequences of pleas.84 Since this rule was not
“dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s
conviction became final,” it is necessarily a new rule85 and may
not be applied retroactively unless it qualifies for one of
Teague’s very narrow exceptions.86 In contrast, courts that have
applied Padilla retroactively, such as the Clarke court, frame the
rule as the right to effective counsel, as explained in
Strickland.87 According to those courts, the right to counsel does
not “break[] new ground or impose[] a new obligation on the
State or Federal Government”; rather, it is an old rule88 and
must apply retroactively. As these cases demonstrate, the way
that a particular court frames Padilla’s rule effectively dictates
the eventual outcome of its retroactivity analysis.
C. Split Among the Courts
Following Padilla, various courts have applied the Teague
doctrine to allegations involving plea deals entered into prePadilla, and have come to opposite conclusions regarding the
retroactive application of the Padilla decision.89 This variation

(concluding Padilla merely “applied its Strickland precedents to a new set of
facts”).
84
See Doan v. United States, 760 F. Supp. 2d 602, 605 (E.D. Va.
2011); United States v. Gilbert, No. 2:03-cr-00349-WJM-1, 2010 WL
4134286, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 19, 2010).
85
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989).
86
Although a few writers advocate application of Teague’s “watershed
rule” exception to Padilla, this view is not generally supported. See infra
Part I.C.
87
See, e.g., Al Kokabani v. United States, No. 5:06-CR-207-FL, 2010
WL 3941836, at *5 (E.D.N.C. July 30, 2010); Clarke, 949 N.E.2d at 904;
Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
88
Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
89
See cases cited supra note 61 (listing cases applying Padilla
retroactively and cases not applying Padilla retroactively, all using the
Teague retroactivity analysis).
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may be due to a difference in framing.90 Through an examination
of specific reasons courts have provided in their retroactivity
analysis, it is apparent that the difference in rule framing
pervasively dictates results.
Courts that have applied Padilla retroactively have identified
Padilla’s rule as the right to effective counsel, as explained in
Strickland. Such framing produces an “old rule” for Teague
purposes, and therefore requires retroactive application. Some
courts have found further support for this conclusion in language
from the Padilla opinion. Courts that have declined to apply
Padilla retroactively have identified Padilla’s rule as counsel’s
requirement to inform clients of the potential immigration
consequences of a guilty plea. Such framing produces a “new
rule” for Teague purposes, and therefore prohibits retroactive
application. These courts have found that neither of the
exceptions to Teague’s rule that new rules of criminal procedure
do not apply retroactively apply to Padilla.
The majority of opinions applying Padilla retroactively have
found that the decision did not create a new rule.91 The Third
Circuit took this approach in United States v. Orocio. In Orocio,
the court held that Padilla recognized “that a plea agreement’s
immigration consequences constitute the sort of information an
alien defendant needs” in order to make decisions “affecting the
outcome of the plea process.”92 Thus, according to the Orocio
court, the requirement that counsel inform his or her client of
immigration consequences provides nothing new, as “the Court
had long required effective assistance of counsel on all
‘important decisions,’ in plea bargaining that could ‘affect[] the
90

See supra Part I.B.
See, e.g., United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 641 (3d Cir. 2011)
(holding that Padilla “is an ‘old rule’ for Teague purposes and is
retroactively applicable on collateral review”); Bawaneh v. United States,
No. CV-10-7805 CAS, 2011 WL 1465775, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2011)
(old rule); United States v. Chavarria, No. 2:10-CV-191 JVB, 2011 WL
1336565, at *2–3 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 7, 2011) (old rule), order vacated on
reconsideration, No. 2:10-CV-191 JVB, 2011 WL 4916568 (N.D. Ind. Oct.
14, 2011); United States v. Diaz-Palmerin, No. 08-cr-777-3, 2011 WL
1337326, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 5, 2011) (old rule).
92
Orocio, 645 F.3d at 638.
91
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outcome of the plea process.’”93 The court further noted,
“[e]very Strickland claim requires a fact-specific inquiry, but it is
not the case that every Strickland ruling on new facts requires the
announcement of a ‘new rule.’”94 Similarly, in United States v.
Hubenig, the Eastern District of California noted that “[w]hen the
Supreme Court applies a well-established rule of law in a new
way based on the specific facts of a particular case, it does not
generally establish a new rule.”95 The Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, in Commonwealth v. Clarke, similarly reasoned
that Padilla did not create a new rule, but rather had applied “an
established constitutional standard on a case-by-case basis,
incorporating evolving professional norms (on which the standard
relies) to new facts.”96 In other words, these courts considered
Padilla to have simply “applied an old rule in a new context.”97
Courts that have found that Padilla did not create a new rule
have, in some instances, also had to grapple with the fact that
Padilla overruled precedent in their jurisdiction,98 which
opponents of Padilla’s retroactive application argue shows that
“the result [of Padilla] was not dictated by precedent existing at
the time the defendant’s conviction became final,” and is
therefore a new rule under the limited guidance of Teague.99
Addressing that argument in Hubenig, the Eastern District of
California found the existence of conflicting precedent “not
dispositive of whether [Padilla] established a new rule for
Teague purposes,” because “the standard for determining when
a case establishes a new rule is ‘objective,’ and the mere
93

Id. (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
94
Id. at 640.
95
United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-MJ-040, 2010 WL 2650625, at *5
(E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010).
96
Commonwealth v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892, 903 (Mass. 2011).
97
People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398, 403 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
98
See Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 690 (7th Cir. 2011)
(“Prior to Padilla, the lower federal courts, including at least nine Courts of
Appeals, had uniformly held that the Sixth Amendment did not require
counsel to provide advice concerning any collateral (as opposed to direct)
consequences of a guilty plea.”).
99
See id. at 688–91.
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existence of conflicting authority does not necessarily mean a rule
is new.”100 Other courts have responded in a similar fashion.101
Courts that have found that Padilla relief should not be made
retroactively available to defendants whose conviction pre-dates
Padilla have argued that the decision created a new rule.102 In
United States v. Chapa, the Northern District of Georgia found
that Padilla’s result “was not dictated by precedent existing at
the time [that a pre-Padilla defendant’s] conviction became
final,” because existing precedent nation-wide “dictated the
opposite result.”103 Additionally, in United States v. Perez, the
District of Nebraska pointed out that it was not the “prevailing
professional norm” to inform a defendant of immigration
consequences of his guilty plea.104
Other courts have cited Alito’s concurrence and Scalia’s
dissent in Padilla as support for classifying Padilla as having
announced a new rule. For instance, in Mendoza v. United
States, the Eastern District of Virginia pointed to the very
existence of Padilla’s concurrence (by Justice Alito) and dissent
(by Justice Scalia) as evidence of a new rule.105 The court
highlighted language from Justice Alito’s opinion, noting that the
majority “effectively overruled ‘the longstanding and unanimous
position of the federal courts . . . that reasonable defense
counsel generally need only advise a client about the direct
100

Hubenig, 2010 WL 2650625, at *7 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 410 (2000)).
101
See, e.g., Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 404 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at
410; Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 304 (1992)); Ex parte Tanklevskaya,
No. 01-10-00627-CR, 2011 WL 2132722, at *6–7 (Tex. Ct. App. May 26,
2011).
102
E.g., Dennis v. United States, 787 F. Supp. 2d 425, 427–30 (D.S.C.
2011); Mendoza v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 2d 791, 797 (E.D. Va.
2011); Banos v. United States, No. 10-23314-CIV, 2011 WL 835789, at *2
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2011); Doan v. United States, 760 F. Supp. 2d 602, 605–
06 (E.D. Va. 2011); United States v. Perez, No. 8:02CR296, 2010 WL
4643033, at *2 (D. Neb. Nov. 9, 2010).
103
United States v. Chapa, 800 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1221 (N.D. Ga. 2011)
(citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989)).
104
Perez, 2010 WL 4643033, at *2 (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.
510, 521 (2003)).
105
Mendoza, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 797.
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consequences of a criminal conviction.’”106 Similarly, in United
States v. Chang Hong, the Tenth Circuit determined that Padilla
created a new rule, finding support for their conclusion in
Justice Scalia’s argument that, before Padilla, the Supreme
Court “had limited the Sixth Amendment to advice directly
related to defense against criminal prosecutions,” and does not
require advice on collateral consequences of convictions.107
These separate opinions, these courts argue, show that
“reasonable jurists did not find the rule in Padilla compelled or
dictated by the Court’s prior precedent.”108
A few academics have taken the position that Padilla created
a new rule, but that it qualifies for retroactive application under
the “watershed decision” exception to Teague.109 They reason
that, without Padilla’s requirement to inform a defendant of the
deportation consequences of his guilty plea, innocent defendants
who are pessimistic about their chances at trial will be more
likely to submit false guilty pleas in exchange for favorable plea
bargains.110 Thus, “the likelihood of an accurate criminal
conviction is seriously diminished.”111 The watershed exception
is extremely narrow,112 however, and the majority of courts that
have found that Padilla created a new rule have refused to
classify it as watershed rule.113
106

Id. (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1487 (2010)
(Alito, J., concurring)).
107
United States v. Chang Hong, No. 10-6294, 2011 WL 3805763, at *6
(10th Cir. Aug. 30, 2011) (quoting Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1494–95 (Scalia,
J., dissenting)).
108
Id.; Mendoza, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 797.
109
See Bibas, supra note 60, at 1137–51; John L. Holahan & Shauna
Faye Kieffer, Padilla Motions Effective Assistance of Counsel Where Pleas
Mandate Deportation, BENCH & B. MINN., Aug. 2010, at 25, 26.
110
See Holahan & Kieffer, supra note 109.
111
Id. at 27.
112
See Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 407 (2004) (“[The Supreme
Court] has repeatedly emphasized the limited scope of the . . . exception—for
‘watershed rules of criminal procedure . . .’—which ‘is clearly meant to
apply only to a small core of rules requiring observance of those procedures
that . . . are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” (citations omitted)
(quoting O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 157 (1997))).
113
E.g., United States v. Chang Hong, No. 10-6294, 2011 WL 3805763,
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Courts that have held that Padilla created a new rule, before
declining to apply it retroactively, have had to determine that it
is not a “watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating the
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal
proceedings.”114 In Chang Hong, the court pointed out the
narrowness of the “watershed” exception, and noted that “the
[Supreme] Court has rejected every attempt to fit a case within
the exception.”115 In Llanes v. United States, the Middle District
of Florida found that Padilla’s requirement that counsel provide
immigration advice is less significant than what the Supreme
Court envisioned as qualifying as a watershed rule.116 These
courts, and many others, have found that Padilla does not “alter
[the Court’s] understanding of bedrock procedural elements
essential to the fairness of a proceeding,”117 and, therefore, does
not qualify for Teague’s exception to the general rule that new
rules of criminal procedure do not apply retroactively.118
Although the Padilla Court did not make an explicit holding
on retroactivity,119 many lower courts interpreting Padilla have
pointed to certain language in the Supreme Court’s opinion to

at *8–9 (10th Cir. Aug. 30, 2011); Mathur v. United States, Nos. 7:07-CR92-BO, 7:11-CV-67-BO, 2011 WL 2036701, at *2 (E.D.N.C. May 24,
2011); Doan v. United States, 760 F. Supp. 2d 602, 605–06 (E.D. Va.
2011).
114
Llanes v. United States, No. 8:11-CV-682-T-23TBM, 2011 WL
2473233, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 22, 2011) (quoting United States v.
Swindall, 107 F.3d 831, 835 (11th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Under Teague, even new rules apply retroactively if they constitute
watershed rules of criminal procedure. See infra Part II.A.
115
Chang Hong, 2011 WL 3805763, at *8.
116
Llanes, 2011 WL 2473233, at *2 (noting Padilla’s notification
requirement is “far different from Gideon’s establishment of the right to
counsel”).
117
Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 418 (2007) (quoting Tyler v.
Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 665 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
118
See, e.g., Doan v. United States, 760 F. Supp. 2d 602, 605–06 (E.D.
Va. 2011).
119
Absence of an explicit holding of retroactivity by the Supreme Court
does not indicate the Court does not intend retroactive application, as the
Court may “[establish] principles of retroactivity and [leave] the application
of those principles to lower courts.” Tyler, 533 U.S. at 663.
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support its retroactive application.120 Most persuasive, perhaps,
has been the Court’s response to the Solicitor General’s concern
that its decision would open the “floodgates.”121 The Court
stated:
It seems unlikely that our decision today will have a
significant effect on those convictions already obtained as
the result of plea bargains. For at least the past 15 years,
professional norms have generally imposed an obligation
on counsel to provide advice on the deportation
consequences of a client’s plea.122
According to the court in Hubenig, the Supreme Court’s
“floodgates” discussion “signaled that it understood its holding
in Padilla would apply retroactively.”123 If the Supreme Court
did not intend retroactive application of Padilla, the Hubenig
court reasoned, the “floodgates” discussion would have been
unnecessary.124 Likewise, in People v. Garcia, the Kings County
Supreme Court noted the Supreme Court’s treatment of the
“floodgate” issue was “reason[] in [itself] to apply Padilla
retroactively.”125
II. THE NEED FOR RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
Defendants have very few feasible options following a denial
of collateral post-conviction relief; thus, collateral proceedings
become paramount. In cases where courts determine that Padilla
may not be applied retroactively to finalized convictions,
petitioners may theoretically still have recourse through a
petition for habeas corpus.126 In reality, however, the “great

120

See, e.g., United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL
2650625, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010); People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d
398, 402 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
121
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1484–85 (2010).
122
Id.
123
Hubenig, 2010 WL 2650625, at *7.
124
Id.; see also People v. De Jesus, 30 Misc. 3d 1203(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2010) (unpublished table decision).
125
Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
126
28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2006).
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writ” is unlikely to provide relief in these cases.127 In order to
obtain habeas relief, except in extraordinary cases,128 a petitioner
must first exhaust all remedies available in state court.129 This
may include a variety of collateral attacks available through state
statutes.130 Additionally, AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of
limitations for filing habeas petitions.131 The statute begins
running when a defendant’s judgment becomes final by the
conclusion of direct review.132 Furthermore, individuals may be
deported before their habeas petitions are reviewed,133 and in
such cases, are often barred from habeas relief.134 Thus, “few
127

See Margaret Colgate Love & Gabriel J. Chin, Padilla v. Kentucky:
The Right to Counsel and the Collateral Consequences of Conviction,
CHAMPION, May 2010, at 20, available at http://www.pardonlaw.com/
materials/love-chin_may_feature.pdf.
128
See, e.g., Lee v. Stickman, 357 F.3d 338, 343–44 (3d Cir.
2004) (exhaustion requirement excused because unresolved petition
challenging conviction pended in state court for eight years). But see, e.g.,
Williams v. Sims, 390 F.3d 958, 963 (7th Cir. 2004) (exhaustion
requirement not excused though state delayed because petitioner’s habeas
petition was untimely).
129
§ 2254(b)(1)(A).
130
See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10 (McKinney 2005)
(motion to vacate judgment).
131
§ 2244(d)(1). AEDPA additionally greatly restricts habeas relief by
limiting it to cases that have been adjudicated in state court “contrary to, or
[in] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 2254(d)(1). See
generally Ursula Bentele, The Not So Great Writ: Trapped in the Narrow
Holdings of Supreme Court Precedents, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 741
(2010).
132
§ 2244(d)(1)(A). If a defendant unsuccessfully petitions for certiorari
in the highest state court or the Supreme Court of the United States, his
petition becomes “final by the conclusion of direct review” on the day
certiorari is denied, with that day counting as the first day of the one-year
limitation. Lisa L. Bellamy, Playing for Time: The Need for Equitable Tolling
of the Habeas Corpus Statute of Limitations, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 13
(2004).
133
See
Immigration
and
Nationality
Act,
8
U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(3)(B) (1999) (“Service of the petition on the officer or employee
does not stay the removal of an alien pending the court’s decision on the
petition, unless the court orders otherwise.”).
134
Some courts find petitions from deported individuals are moot. See,
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will navigate this procedural minefield successfully.”135
Therefore, for defendants seeking the protection of Padilla,
post-conviction challenges may provide the last chance to avoid
deportation.
Additionally, there may be a substantial length of time
between when a noncitizen’s criminal conviction becomes final
and the time he or she is removed. There is a tremendous
backlog of cases in immigration courts.136 In September 2011,
297,551 cases were pending in immigration courts,137 24,661 of
which involved individuals rendered deportable by criminal
convictions.138 The average length of time criminal immigration
cases had been pending was 403 days.139 The wait in some
courts, however, is significantly longer.140 The time courts take
to render decisions is also very long. Courts took, on average,
166 days to render removal decisions issued in September
2011.141 Immigration courts in New York City took an average
e.g., Sule v. INS, No. 98-1090, 1999 WL 668716, at *2 (10th Cir. Aug. 27,
1999). For a discussion on the permissibility of habeas review for deported
individuals, however, see Alison Leal Parker, Note, In Through the Out
Door? Retaining Judicial Review for Deported Lawful Permanent Resident
Aliens, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (2001).
135
Love & Chin, supra note 127, at 20.
136
See Leni B. Benson & Russell R. Wheeler, Taking Steps to Enhance
Quality and Timeliness in Immigration Removal Adjudication 31 (Jan. 12,
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.acus.gov/wpcontent/uploads/downloads/2012/01/ACUS-Immigration-RemovalAdjudication-Draft-Report-1_12_12.pdf (discussing the increase in “per judge
workload” and the resulting backlog in immigration courts).
137
Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRAC IMMIGR., http://trac.syr.edu/
phptools/immigration/court_backlog/ (select “Pending Cases” under “What to
graph”; then select “All Charges” under “Charge Type”) (last visited Feb.
24, 2012).
138
Id. (select “Pending Cases” under “What to graph”; then select
“Criminal/Nat. Sec./Terror” under “Charge Type”). The number of pending
criminal immigration cases also includes individuals allegedly deportable on
national security or terrorism grounds. Id.
139
Id. (select “Average Days” under “What to tabulate”; then select
“Criminal/Nat. Sec./Terror” under “Charge Type”).
140
In Los Angeles, for example, criminal immigration cases pending in
September 2011 had been pending, on average, for 699 days. Id.
141
Immigration Court Processing Time by Outcome, TRAC IMMIGR.,
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of 623 days to process removal decisions.142 This data reveals
that criminal immigration proceedings often involve convictions
finalized more than a year and a half earlier, and in some cities,
such as New York and Los Angeles, three or more years
earlier. Thus, the potential class of claimants affected by the
retroactivity of Padilla remains huge.
The following section explains why an accurate application
of Padilla requires courts to frame its rule as the right to
effective counsel. Courts inaccurately framing the rule as
counsel’s requirement to inform clients of the potential
immigration consequences improperly deny petitioners access to
Padilla’s benefits.
A. Courts Must Frame Padilla’s Rule as the Right to
Effective Counsel, as explained in Strickland
A proper application of Padilla requires courts to frame
Padilla’s rule as the right to effective counsel, and thereby apply
the decision retroactively. Strickland is a rule of general
application, which is seldom likely to create a “new rule” for
Teague purposes. While application of Strickland to new facts
may yield a novel result, as was the case in Padilla, such a
result does imply creation of a “new rule.” Rather, a case’s
fact-specific novel result may be its holding, which courts
should not mistake for the case’s broader rule.
1. A Rule of General Application
In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito claimed that the
imposition of a duty to inform clients of immigration
consequences “marks a major upheaval in Sixth Amendment
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/court_proctime_outco
me.php (select “Average Days” under “What to tabulate”; then select
“Removals” under “Outcome Type”) (last visited Feb. 24, 2012). This
measures the average number of days between the recorded filing date and
the date the case was closed. About the Data, TRAC IMMIGR.,
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/about_data.html (last
visited Feb. 24, 2012).
142
Immigration Court Processing Time by Outcome, supra note 141.
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law,”143 and pointed out an absence of precedent “holding that
criminal defense counsel’s failure to provide advice concerning
the removal consequences of a criminal conviction violates a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”144 Several courts
have pointed to this language as evidence that Padilla created a
new rule.145 This reasoning, however, ignores the nature of
Strickland’s inquiry into whether counsel’s performance was
constitutionally effective.
Strickland calls for a fact-centered analysis, requiring “a
case-by-case examination of the evidence . . . .”146 It created a
rule of general application, “establish[ing] a broad and flexible
standard for the review of an attorney’s performance in a variety
of factual circumstances.”147 In his concurring opinion in Wright
v. West, Justice Kennedy explained the unlikelihood of a rule of
general application creating a new rule for Teague purposes: “If
the rule in question is one which of necessity requires a case-bycase examination of the evidence, then we can tolerate a number
of specific applications without saying that those applications
themselves create a new rule . . . .”148 Justice Kennedy made it
clear that, in the application of such rules, “it will be the
infrequent case that yields a result so novel that it forges a new
rule, one not dictated by precedent.”149 Therefore, rules that rely
on case-by-case examinations, such as Strickland, may be
applied in a variety of circumstances without establishing a new
rule for Teague purposes.150
143

Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1491 (2010) (Alito, J.,
concurring).
144
Id.
145
See, e.g., United States v. Chang Hong, No. 10-6294, 2011 WL
3805763, at *6 (10th Cir. Aug. 30, 2011); Sarria v. United States, No. 1120730-CIV, 2011 WL 4949724, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2011); Mendoza v.
United States, 774 F. Supp. 2d 791, 797 (E.D. Va. 2011).
146
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) (quoting Wright v.
West, 505 U.S. 277, 308 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
147
Newland v. Hall, 527 F.3d 1162, 1197 (11th Cir. 2008).
148
Wright, 505 U.S. at 308 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
149
Id. at 309.
150
Id. at 308–09.
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Justice Kennedy’s point is well illustrated by several
Supreme Court decisions applying Strickland to various fact
patterns, none of which have been deemed to have created a
new rule for Teague purposes.151 In Williams v. Taylor, the
Court applied Strickland to determine that counsel’s failure to
introduce known evidence regarding defendant’s borderline
mental retardation and troubled childhood constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel.152 Three years later, in Wiggins v. Smith,153
the Court applied Strickland to counsels’ failure to investigate
their defendant’s dysfunctional background, finding such conduct
to constitute ineffective assistance.154 Yet again, in Rompilla v.
Beard,155 the Court applied Strickland to find that defense
counsel’s failure to sufficiently investigate aggravating factors in
the sentencing phase of a defendant’s capital murder trial
constituted ineffective assistance, despite suggestions by the
defendant’s family that mitigating factors were not present.156
Despite the fact that these cases created or imposed on defense
counsel a set of increased obligations, not one of the cases has
been found to have created a new rule. They are, rather,
applications of Strickland’s articulation of the right to effective
counsel, which “can hardly be said [to]. . . ‘break[s] new
ground or impose[s] a new obligation on the States.’”157
Padilla is another in a long line of Strickland cases applying
an old rule of general application to new circumstances:
counsel’s failure to inform a client of deportation consequences
following significant changes in immigration law.158 Padilla’s
151

See Al Kokabani v. United States, No. 5:06-CR-207-FL, 2010 WL
3941836, at *4 (E.D.N.C. July 30, 2010).
152
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000).
153
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
154
Id. at 523–27.
155
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
156
Id. at 383.
157
Williams, 529 U.S. at 391 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,
301 (1989)).
158
See supra Part I (discussing the changes to immigration law brought
by AEDPA and IIRIRA); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473,
1480 (2010) (“[AEDPA and IIRIRA’s] changes to our immigration law have
dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen’s criminal conviction.”).
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pronouncement that an attorney’s failure to inform his or her
client of a plea’s deportation consequences constitutes ineffective
counsel159 may have differed from any previous applications of
Strickland, but considering the nature of Strickland inquiries, did
not establish a new rule. Some courts have argued that Padilla’s
application of Strickland is exceptional, as it imposes a duty on
defense counsel to advise on collateral consequences.160 As the
Court noted in Padilla, however, “[w]e . . . have never applied
a distinction between direct and collateral consequences to define
the scope of constitutionally ‘reasonable professional assistance’
required under Strickland.”161 Padilla simply involved another
instance of the familiar pattern of a rule of general application:
an old rule applied to new facts, yielding new results.
2. Wide Rules, Narrow Holdings
Courts framing Padilla’s rule as counsel’s requirement to
inform clients of immigration consequences of a conviction may
be failing to distinguish the case’s “rule” from its holding.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “legal ruling” as “a ruling on
a point of law . . . reached by the judge as a necessary step in
the decision,”162 and a holding as “1. A court’s determination of
a matter of law pivotal to its decision,” and “2. A ruling on
evidence or other questions presented at trial.”163 Although these
may sound similar, there are meaningful differences between the
two.164 A holding is attached to a particular case, and is often
fact-specific.165 Rules, on the other hand, can be synthesized
159

Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483.
See, e.g., United States v. Laguna, No. 10 CR 342, 2011 WL
1357538, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2011).
161
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 689 (1984)).
162
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 629 (3d pocket ed. 2006).
163
Id. at 331.
164
David H. Tennant, The Hazards of Over-Selling: Ipse Dixits and
Other Unsubstantiated Arguments, FOR DEF., Aug. 2006, at 72, 72.
165
Bentele, supra note 131, at 744 (“[D]efining the holding of a case is
less straightforward; those seeking to expand the reach of a precedent will
characterize the decision broadly, while one who disapproves of the previous
160
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from multiple cases,166 and, therefore, often have wider or more
general application than holdings. Particularly in the context of
Teague’s retroactivity analysis, “rules of law may be sufficiently
clear for habeas purposes even when they are expressed in terms
of a generalized standard rather than as a bright-line rule.”167
With this framework in mind, it appears reasonable, if not
necessary, to characterize Padilla’s rule as the more general
principle of “the right to counsel,” and its holding as the more
fact-specific principle that counsel’s failure to inform clients of
deportation consequences constitutes ineffective assistance.
The difference between a case’s holding and its rule for
Teague purposes is well illustrated in Lewis v. Johnson.168 In
1987, Charles Lewis pled guilty to six counts of robbery and
nine other criminal offenses in the Pennsylvania Court of
Common Pleas, and was sentenced to thirty to sixty years in
prison.169 In the eight years following his conviction, Lewis filed
two petitions in Pennsylvania state court for post-conviction
relief, alleging that his court-appointed trial counsel was
ineffective on a number of grounds, including for failing to file
a direct appeal.170 Both petitions were denied.171 The court found
that relief was precluded by Pennsylvania case law that had held
“trial counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to file a
direct appeal when not requested to do so.”172 In August 2000,
Lewis filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, but his petition
was denied.173 Lewis appealed, relying on Roe v. FloresOrtega,174 decided by the Supreme Court two months before he
had filed his habeas petition,175 in which the Court used the
outcome will narrow it to its specific facts.”).
166
Tennant, supra note 164, at 72.
167
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 382 (2000).
168
Lewis v. Johnson, 359 F.3d 646 (3d Cir. 2004).
169
Id. at 649.
170
Id. at 650–51.
171
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Id. at 650.
173
Id. at 651.
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Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000).
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Lewis, 359 F.3d at 651.
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Strickland test to find that “counsel had a constitutionally imposed
duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal when there is
reason to think either (1) that a rational defendant would want to
appeal . . . or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably
demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing.”176
Since Flores-Ortega was decided after Lewis’ conviction
became final, the Third Circuit conducted a Teague analysis to
determine whether the decision applied retroactively.177 The
court framed Flores-Ortega’s rule as “the Strickland standard,”
and, thus, found it to be an “old rule,” which applied
retroactively.178 Applying the Flores-Ortega decision to Lewis’
case, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded, instructing the
district court to grant Lewis’ petition conditioned upon the
Commonwealth’s reinstatement of his right of first appeal.179 The
court characterized Flores-Ortega as holding that “criminal
defense attorneys have a constitutional duty to consult and advise
defendants of their appellate rights.”180 Although this holding
was contrary to state case law, the court properly recognized
that Strickland, as a rule of general application, may produce
novel results, but is, by no means, a new rule.181 It further noted
that “case law need not exist on all fours to allow for a finding
under Teague that the rule at issue was dictated by Supreme
Court precedent.”182 Had the court mistaken Flores-Ortega’s
holding (criminal defense attorneys have a constitutional duty to
advise defendants of their appellate rights) for its rule (the right
to effective counsel), Lewis would probably not have found
habeas relief.
In the last fifteen years, it has become even more important
that courts differentiate between rules and holdings during
Teague retroactivity inquiries. In addition to imposing a one176

Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 480.
Lewis, 359 F.3d at 652–57.
178
See id. at 655 (“Flores-Ortega’s application of the Strickland standard
was dictated by precedent and merely clarified the law as it applied to the
particular facts of that case.”).
179
Id. at 662.
180
Id. at 652.
181
Id. at 655.
182
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year statute of limitations on habeas filing,183 AEDPA has greatly
limited the claims on which relief may be granted.184 AEDPA
included an amendment to the habeas corpus statutes providing:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf
of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim
that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States . . . .185
In recent years, “clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court” has been interpreted as Supreme Court
holdings,186 and often in a manner narrowly tailored to the facts
of the case.187 Thus, unless a habeas petitioner presents a claim
with a substantially similar fact pattern as a case previously
decided by the Supreme Court, district courts will likely find
that the state court conviction was not “contrary to” or “an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law”188
and that habeas relief, therefore, cannot be granted.189
However, a small oasis in this restricted habeas
jurisprudence may be found for petitioners relying on decisions
announced after their convictions became final. In Williams v.
Taylor, the Supreme Court stated, “whatever would qualify as
an old rule under our Teague jurisprudence will constitute
‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
183

See supra Part II (discussing AEDPA’s statute of limitations for filing
petitions for habeas corpus).
184
See Stefan Ellis, Gonzalez v. Crosby and the Use of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b) in Habeas Proceedings, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 207,
208 (2010).
185
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, tit. 1, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218–19 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(1) (2006)). AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Id.
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Bentele, supra note 131, at 741.
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See id. at 751–54.
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§ 2254(d)(1)–(2).
189
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Court of the United States’ under [AEDPA].”190 According to
this instruction, if a habeas petitioner relies on a Supreme Court
decision announced after his conviction became final, and if the
court entertaining the petition finds the rule of the relied upon
case is old, the petitioner may reap the benefits of the case even
if the facts of his case are not substantially similar. In contrast,
if the same petitioner relied on the same Supreme Court case,
but the case had been decided before his conviction became
final, he could only realize the protections of its holding, which
might require the facts of the two cases to be substantially
similar. It appears that retroactively applied decisions may offer
wider habeas relief. When a court mistakes a holding for a rule
in its Teague analysis, however, it extinguishes this opportunity.
Courts that have declined to apply Padilla retroactively failed
to appreciate Strickland’s nature as a rule of general applicability.
These courts inaccurately identified Padilla’s rule, perhaps
confusing it with the case’s holding. Their incorrect application of
Padilla deprived petitioners of what may have been their last
opportunity to maintain their lives in the United States.
B. Alternatively, State Courts Should Use Their Power Under
Danforth v. Minnesota to Give Broader Effect to New
Rules
A proper appreciation for the Strickland rule’s nature as a rule
of general application, as well as for the distinction between
Padilla’s “rule” and its “holding,” compel courts to frame
Padilla’s rule as the right to effective counsel—an old rule which
191
thus requires retroactive application. State courts that remain
unconvinced, however, have an alternative means by which they
may give Padilla retroactive effect. Even after concluding that
Padilla created a new rule, and that it therefore does not apply
retroactively under Teague, state courts may give Padilla
retroactive effect through their power under Danforth v.
Minnesota.192
190
191
192

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000) (quoting § 2254(d)(1)).
See supra Part II.A.
Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008).
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The Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Danforth v.
Minnesota greatly altered retroactivity jurisprudence.193 The
Court examined “whether Teague constrains the authority of
state courts to give broader effect to new rules of criminal
procedure than is required by that opinion.”194 The majority
concluded that it did not; instead, according to the Court,
Teague “limits the kinds of constitutional violations that will
entitle an individual to relief on federal habeas, but does not in
any way limit the authority of a state court, when reviewing its
own state criminal convictions, to provide a remedy for a
violation that is deemed ‘nonretroactive’ under Teague.”195 Thus,
under Danforth, a state may design its own retroactivity
standards for federal constitutional rules in excess of the federal
minimum set by Teague.196 State courts have already begun using
their power under Danforth to design their own retroactivity
principles.197
In the Padilla context, if the highest state court determines
that Padilla created a new rule, and is thus not retroactively
applicable under Teague, the court may apply its own
retroactivity principles in a manner allowing for retroactive
application of Padilla. Padilla applications provide a perfect
opportunity for state courts to revise their retroactivity principles
in a way that provides greater post-conviction relief in the wake
of AEDPA’s constriction of federal habeas relief.198

193

See generally Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of Teague
Retroactivity, or “Redressability,” After Danforth v. Minnesota: Why Lower
Courts Should Give Retroactive Effect to New Constitutional Rules of
Criminal Procedure in Postconviction Proceedings, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1
(2009).
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C. Finality Interests
Since “retroactive application may affect defendants whose
trials are long since over,” it involves important finality
concerns.199 These concerns are especially relevant in the
retroactive application of Padilla, which may affect a large
number of final convictions. In Barrios Cruz v. State, the court
concluded that a retroactive application of Padilla “would
undermine the perceived and actual finality of criminal
judgments,” and declined to apply Padilla retroactively.200 Many
other courts express similar finality concerns.201
However, applying Padilla retroactively will not significantly
hamper interests of finality, because defendants permitted to
benefit from Padilla still face a significant hurdle. A successful
claim of ineffective counsel under Strickland requires that a
defendant prove not only that his counsel’s performance was
deficient, but also that he was prejudiced by the deficient
performance.202
In Padilla, the majority “[gave] serious consideration to the
concerns . . . regarding the importance of protecting the finality
of convictions obtained through guilty pleas,” but explained,
“[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task . . . .
[T]o obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must
convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain
would have been rational under the circumstances.”203 The
majority predicted that “lower courts—now quite experienced
with applying Strickland—[could] effectively and efficiently use
its framework to separate specious claims from those with
204
This prediction appears to have been
substantial merit.”
199
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accurate, as some courts have applied Padilla retroactively, but
found that claims did not warrant relief because defendants
failed to show prejudice.205 Others avoided the retroactivity
analysis altogether by first determining that a defendant was not
prejudiced.206 Accurate application of Strickland’s prejudice
requirement ensures that retroactive application of Padilla will
only disturb the finality of meritorious claims.
CONCLUSION
Certain criminal acts render a lawful permanent resident
deportable in an instant.207 Even misdemeanors, such as
possession of thirty-one grams of marijuana208 or distribution of
obscene material,209 can lead to removal.210 The Padilla Court
carefully considered the “[changing] landscape of federal
immigration law” and recognized that “deportation is an integral
part . . . of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen
defendants.”211 Based on these considerations, it found that an
attorney has a duty to advise her client of deportation
consequences of a guilty plea, and failure to do so is grounds for
a claim of ineffective counsel.212
Padilla was a victory for many, but that victory was
diminished by some jurisdictions’ refusal to apply Padilla
retroactively.213 The stark division among courts as to whether
205
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Padilla created a new rule for Teague purposes, and thus could
not be applied retroactively, effectively leaves a noncitizen
defendant’s fate to the happenstance of his or her location of
conviction.214 Courts that have found that Padilla created a new
rule did so because they framed Padilla’s rule as an attorney’s
duty to provide immigration advice.215 Framing the rule in this
way, however, ignores Strickland’s nature as a rule of general
application, as well as the distinction between Padilla’s rule and
holding.216 By mischaracterizing Padilla’s rule, courts not only
apply Padilla inaccurately, but they also miss an opportunity to
correct great harm to uninformed or ill-informed noncitizen
defendants and the families and communities from which they
are removed.217 In contrast, framing Padilla’s rule as the right to
effective counsel allows courts to address these harms without
greatly disturbing interests of finality.218 State courts have the
additional option of giving Padilla retroactive effect, even if
they find it “nonretroactive” under Teague.219 Padilla has the
potential to be a victory for accuracy and fairness in criminal
proceedings, but it is up to the courts to fulfill its promise.

Citizenship in State Courts, MD. B.J., Sept.-Oct. 2011, at 6, 13.
214
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